Leheny v. Cty of Pittsburgh by unknown
1999 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-7-1999 
Leheny v. Cty of Pittsburgh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999 
Recommended Citation 
"Leheny v. Cty of Pittsburgh" (1999). 1999 Decisions. 193. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/193 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1999 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed July 7, 1998 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Nos. 98-3356, 98-3364, 98-3405 
 
THOMAS E. LEHENY; JAMES R. RAMSEY; ARTHUR 
MARUNICH, for themselves and others similarly situated 
 
       Thomas E. Leheny, 
       Appellant No. 98-3364 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PITTSBURGH; POLICEMEN'S RELIEF AND 
PENSION FUND OF THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH; 
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, FORT PITT LODGE 
NO. 1 
 
       City of Pittsburgh, 
       Appellant Nos. 98-3356/3405 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 94-cv-00866) 
District Judge: Hon. Maurice B. Cohill, Jr. 
 
Argued: May 4, 1999 
 
Before: ALDISERT, WEIS and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges, 
 
(Filed: July 7, 1999) 
 
 
  
       Joseph S. Hornack (argued) 
       Healey, Davidson & Hornack 
       Fifth Floor 
       Law & Finance Building 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 
        ATTORNEY FOR 
        APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS 
 
       Brian P. Gabriel (argued) 
       Assistant City Solicitor 
       City of Pittsburgh Department 
        of Law 
       Firm #046 
       313 City-County Building 
       414 Grant Street 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 
        ATTORNEY FOR 
        APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
These cross-appeals by the City of Pittsburgh and three 
retired police officers (the "Retirees") require us to decide 
whether a City policy that offsets pension benefits for 
disabled retired police officers by worker's compensation 
benefits violates equal protection and due process rights 
and constitutes a violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. S 12101 et seq. ("ADA"). The 
district court dismissed the Retirees' ADA claim but 
submitted the constitutional claims to a jury that awarded 
compensatory damages. 
 
In its appeal from the judgment on the jury verdict, the 
City contends that the court erred in not granting judgment 
as a matter of law on the equal protection and due process 
claims. In their appeal, the Retirees contend that the court 
erred in dismissing their ADA claim. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
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We hold that the district court correctly dismissed the 
Retirees' ADA claim but erred when it failed to grant 
judgment as a matter of law in the City's favor on the equal 
protection and due process claims. Accordingly, we will 
affirm in part and reverse in part. 
 
I. 
 
The Retirees are former police officers for the City of 
Pittsburgh. Each suffered a work-related injury and 
received his full rate of salary pursuant to the Heart and 
Lung Act, 53 P.S. S 637, until approximately December 14, 
1992.1 On December 14, 1992, Thomas E. Leheny and 
James R. Ramsey signed documents acknowledging their 
permanent disability, and therefore became ineligible for 
Heart and Lung Act benefits but eligible to collect worker's 
compensation and reduced pension benefits. These appeals 
pertain to the amount of pension benefits for which the 
Retirees became eligible. 
 
Prior to 1992, police officers who were unable to return 
to work due to injury remained on the City's active payroll 
and received 100% of their salary pursuant to the Heart 
and Lung Act. These payments placed a significant strain 
on the City's fiscal integrity. 
 
The City's financial concerns were addressed in March 
1992, after an impasse had been reached in the collective 
bargaining process with the Fraternal Order of Police 
(F.O.P.), when an arbitration award was issued that 
eventually became a part of a collective bargaining 
agreement. Officers meeting age and service eligibility 
requirements could choose to be placed on one of two lists 
of officers who wished to retire prior to the end of 1995 
under an "early retirement incentive plan." List A would 
consist of all officers seeking immediate retirement. List B 
would consist of all officers who wished to retire before 
December 31, 1995, when eligibility for this early 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Retirees accepted Heart and Lung Act benefits in lieu of lesser 
benefits provided pursuant to the Pennsylvania Worker's Compensation 
Act, 77 P.S. S 1 et seq. The Heart and Lung Act permits police officers to 
receive their full salary during a period of temporary disability. 
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retirement incentive would end. Officers on List B could be 
retired by the City at any time after all officers on List A 
had been retired, but were guaranteed retirement by 
December 31, 1995. 
 
Officers selecting to be placed on either list were required 
to fill out a Retirement Incentive Window Irrevocable 
Application Form prior to September 1, 1992. See App. at 
115 (arbitration award provision), 121 (letter from Fraternal 
Order of Police to officers describing procedure for early 
retirement incentive). The Retirees chose to be placed on 
List B. 
 
Pursuant to the arbitration award, officers on either list 
who were at least 50 years of age and had at least 25 years 
of service were given the opportunity to receive an 
enhanced retirement benefit equal to 75% of their average 
monthly pay without service increments. App. at 115-116. 
For disabled officers who were receiving worker's 
compensation, the award provided that: 
 
       An employee who is receiving worker's compensation 
       benefits can receive up to 66 2/3 [%] of pay from 
       worker's compensation and receive 50% of average 
       monthly pay plus service increments under the Police 
       Pension Plan without any offset. . . . However, an 
       employee who is already eligible on retirement for 
       combined benefits in excess of 75% of average monthly 
       pay and who elects to retire pursuant to the retirement 
       incentive shall not be entitled to any additional pension 
       benefit from the retirement incentive provided for in 
       this Award. In the event that such employee's worker's 
       compensation benefits are reduced or eliminated after 
       retirement, the employee shall be entitled to such 
       pension enhancement as is necessary to maintain a 
       benefit, including worker's compensation, if any, which 
       is 75% of average monthly pay at retirement.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This reduced pension was available to all permanently disabled 
officers, regardless of age and service. See City's Br. at 18. Because the 
reduced pension for disabled officers was not limited to those who met 
the 50 years of age/25 years of service plateau, there may have been 
officers who were eligible for reduced benefits because they collect 
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App. at 116. Officers who accepted this enhancement but 
continued to receive worker's compensation were not 
deemed "voluntary quits." 
 
The Retirees were requested to sign supplemental 
agreements acknowledging their permanent disability. By 
signing these agreements, the Retirees agreed to the 
termination of their benefits under the Heart and Lung Act, 
which provided 100% salary payments. In place of these 
benefits, the Retirees would be eligible to receive worker's 
compensation benefits, which provide up to 66 2/3% of the 
worker's salary. The City planned to submit these 
agreements to an office in Harrisburg to terminate payment 
of Heart and Lung Act benefits. 
 
The City had retained Sedgwick James, an independent 
agency retained by the City for disability claims 
management service, to process these claims. Leheny and 
Ramsey were shown a letter from Sedgwick James that 
directed the F.O.P.'s attorney to contact certain officers and 
have them sign supplemental agreements acknowledging 
that they were permanently disabled. This letter stated that 
"[if anyone decides not to sign the agreement, then I [Kelly 
Ryan, a Sedgwick James employee] will have no recourse 
but to file a Termination with the Heart and Lung Panel." 
App. at 954. 
 
Leheny and Ramsey signed the agreements. They testified 
at trial that they interpreted the letter to mean that they 
would lose all of their work-related and injury-related 
benefit payments if they did not sign the supplemental 
agreement. They contended that they were not informed 
that Ryan had no authority to terminate or file a 
termination of Heart and Lung Act benefits, nor were they 
made aware that they could decline to sign the agreement 
and then go before an arbitrator if the City filed a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
worker's compensation, but who were not eligible for the enhanced 
incentive pension. Those officers would not be "similarly situated" to 
those receiving the 75% pension, and thus the provision would not be 
unconstitutional on its face. Here, however, it is clear that the Retirees 
each had achieved the age and service requirement, and thus we must 
determine whether the provision is unconstitutional as applied to them. 
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termination petition. Retiree Arthur Marunich, however, 
refused to sign the supplemental agreement, and received a 
hearing in front of an arbitrator in accordance with the 
arbitration award's grievance procedure.3  
 
After Leheny and Ramsey signed the supplemental 
agreements, they applied for the 75% pensions provided for 
by the arbitration award. In January 1993, the City's 
Policemen's Relief and Pension Fund (the "Fund") approved 
Leheny's and Ramsey's applications for retirement benefits. 
However, instead of awarding the 75% pension, the Fund 
awarded Leheny and Ramsey the 50% pension in 
accordance with the provisions of the arbitration award 
because they were receiving worker's compensation 
benefits. 
 
After exhausting administrative procedures, the Retirees 
filed a complaint in the district court, alleging, inter alia, 
that the City, the F.O.P. and the Fund had violated their 
rights to equal compensation under the ADA, as well as 
their equal protection and due process rights. 
 
The Retirees filed a motion for class certification on 
September 2, 1994. On January 27, 1995, the City moved 
for summary judgment. The Retirees also filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment. These motions were assigned to 
a Magistrate Judge, who conducted a hearing and 
subsequently issued her report and recommendation from 
the bench. She recommended that: (1) the Retirees' partial 
motion for summary judgment be denied; (2) the City's 
motion for summary judgment be granted as to the 
Retirees' ADA claim, but be denied in all other respects; 
and (3) the motion for class certification be denied as moot 
if the district court agreed that the ADA claim should be 
dismissed. 
 
The district judge adopted and approved the report and 
recommendation in toto, and set the matter for trial. 
Another district judge presided at the trial. At the close of 
the Retirees' case-in-chief, the City moved for judgment as 
a matter of law. The district court reserved ruling on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Because Marunich received a hearing before an arbitrator, he did not 
allege a violation of his due process rights. 
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motion. At the close of all evidence, the City renewed its 
motion for judgment as a matter of law. Once again, the 
court reserved ruling. 
 
The jury issued special verdicts, finding that: (1) the 
F.O.P. was not acting under color of state law and therefore 
could not be held liable on the constitutional violation 
claims; (2) the City violated Leheny's and Ramsey's due 
process rights when it forced them to sign the supplemental 
agreements; (3) Leheny and Ramsey were entitled to 
compensatory damages in the amounts of $15,000 and 
$22,000 respectively for the due process violations; and (4) 
the City deprived the Retirees of their equal protection 
rights when it determined that the Retirees were only 
entitled to a 50% pension and 66 2/3% worker's 
compensation benefits. After the verdicts were rendered, the 
district court denied the City's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law. 
 
The City timely filed a motion for a new trial, which was 
immediately denied. On April 14, 1998, the Retireesfiled a 
motion for prejudgment interest and a motion for costs and 
attorney's fees. The district court granted the Retirees' 
motions on May 22, 1998, without explanation: The court 
simply signed the Retirees' proposed form of order. These 
appeals followed.4 
 
On appeal, the City contends that the district court was 
obligated, pursuant to case law from this court, to grant the 
motion for judgment as a matter of law as to the Retirees' 
equal protection claim. Further, the City argues that the 
Retirees, as a matter of law, failed to establish that they 
had been forced to retire in violation of their due process 
rights. Conversely, the Retirees contend that our holding in 
Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998), 
requires reinstatement of their ADA claim, and that the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied their 
motion for class certification.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.  The F.O.P. and the Fund are not parties to these appeals. 
5. The City has also appealed certain evidentiary rulings made by the 
district court concerning the admissibility of testimony of non-disabled 
officers' post-retirement earnings and the district court's failure to 
explain its award of prejudgment interest and attorney's fees. These 
issues, as well as the Retirees' appeal of the denial of the motion for 
class certification, need not be addressed because of the discussion that 
follows. 
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II. 
 
We review de novo the district court's denial of the City's 
motions for judgment as a matter of law. Paolella v. 
Browning-Ferris, Inc., 158 F.3d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 1998). "A 
motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted 
only if, `viewing all the evidence . . . in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, no jury could 
decide in that party's favor.' " Id. (quoting Walter v. Holiday 
Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993)). Review of 
the district court's grant of summary judgment in the City's 
favor as to the Retirees' ADA claim is also plenary. Pavlik v. 
Lane Limited/Tobacco Exporters Int'l, 135 F.3d 876, 880 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
 
III. 
 
We conclude that the Retirees' constitutional law claims 
are inconsistent with the teachings of this court in 
Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238, 1246 
(3d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Alessi v. Raybestos- 
Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981), that held that the 
Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") did not 
invalidate a pension plan provision authorizing reductions 
or offsets of pension benefits by amounts received by 
pensioners under a worker's compensation statute. 
 
A. 
 
We begin our analysis of the Retirees' contention that the 
arbitration award violated the Equal Protection Clause with 
a determination of the appropriate standard of review. See 
Donatelli v. Mitchell, 2 F.3d 508, 513 (3d Cir. 1993). The 
Retirees have alleged that state action disparately affected 
the economic rights of a specific group of retired Pittsburgh 
police officers. Because the City's action involves neither 
fundamental rights nor suspect classifications, it is 
accorded a strong presumption of validity and is subject to 
rational basis review, in which the Retirees must establish 
that the action was not rationally related to effecting any 
legitimate government purpose. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 
319-321 (1993). 
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It is clear that the City's asserted purposes for creation of 
the early retirement incentive--to maintain the City's fiscal 
integrity and to avoid paying duplicate benefits--are 
legitimate government concerns. See Graham v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 365, 371-376 (1971). Accordingly, the primary 
question presented here is whether the early retirement 
incentive, with its distinction between retirees who receive 
worker's compensation and those who do not, bears a 
rational relationship to those asserted purposes. 
 
In the context of an ERISA-based action, in Buczynski we 
addressed whether pension benefits and worker's 
compensation benefits are interchangeable. We were called 
upon to determine whether ERISA invalidated a pension 
plan provision that authorized the reduction or offset of 
pension benefits by amounts received by pensioners under 
the worker's compensation statute. The court conducted a 
lengthy analysis that analogized provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code and applicable legislative history regarding 
Congressional approval of offsets of pension benefits by 
amounts received from the Social Security Administration 
to the type of offset at issue here. See Buczynski, 616 F.2d 
at 1244-1246. In S 1021(e) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 
U.S.C. S 401(a)(15), Congress specifically permitted such 
offsets of pension benefits irrespective of ERISA's 
nonforfeiture provision, 29 U.S.C. S 1053(a). 
 
The pensioners in Buczynski argued that offset of 
pension benefits by amounts received from worker's 
compensation could not be sustained on the basis of 
Congress' approval of the Social Security offset. The 
pensioners argued that Social Security benefits and pension 
benefits 
 
       are both designed to compensate for wages lost as a 
       result of old age, and therefore the Social Security 
       offset simply avoids a duplication of benefits directed to 
       the same end. Workmen's Compensation, by contrast, 
       is designed to compensate for losses flowing from 
       employment related injuries; thus, the Workmen's 
       Compensation offset . . . cannot be defended as a 
       means to avoid duplication of benefits. 
 
Buczynski, 616F.2d at 1246. 
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We disagreed with the pensioners' reasoning: 
 
       The plaintiffs' argument here fails to recognize the 
       breadth of the Social Security program. Social Security 
       provides benefits for disabilities, see 42 U.S.C. S 423 
       (1976), as well as benefits for old age. Thus, the Social 
       Security offset that Congress has approved includes, 
       perforce, an offset against pension benefits for 
       disability benefits. The Social Security offset, since it 
       includes an offset of disability benefits, makes any 
       purported distinction between the Social Security offset 
       and the Workmen's Compensation offset meaningless. 
       The disability offset, included within the Social Security 
       offset, thus compels us to reject any purported 
       distinction between Social Security offsets and 
       Workmen's Compensation offsets. 
 
Id. In Alessi, the Court put its imprimatur on our 
discussion. See 451 U.S. at 519-521. 
 
Although Buczynski involved an ERISA-based challenge 
rather than a challenge under the Constitution, the 
precepts enunciated in that case are controlling here. Our 
holding in Buczynski can be distilled to a single concept: An 
offset of pension benefits by a portion of the benefits 
received from worker's compensation is permissible, in the 
same manner as an offset of Social Security benefits, 
because both offsets encompass, at least in part,"an offset 
of disability benefits, mak[ing] any purported distinction 
between [a] Social Security offset and [a] Workmen's 
Compensation offset meaningless." Buczynski, 616 F.2d at 
1246. Because Buczynski stands for the proposition that an 
offset of pension benefits by an amount of received worker's 
compensation benefits is permissible, the offset enforced by 
the City bears a rational relation to the stated government 
purposes of maintaining fiscal integrity and preventing 
payment of duplicate benefits, and therefore withstands 
equal protection scrutiny.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The City's position is made stronger by the arbitration award's 
provision concerning disabled retirees whose worker's compensation 
benefits terminate. The award states that once a retiree's worker's 
compensation benefits cease, the retiree will receive the 75% pension 
given to all non-disabled retirees. Thus, at no point will a retired 
disabled Pittsburgh police officer receive less than his non-disabled 
counterparts. 
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Decisions from several state courts, relied upon by the 
Retirees, do not qualify as proper analogies or persuasive 
argument. See, e.g., Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. 
Romero, 912 P.2d 62 (Colo. 1996) (in banc ); State ex rel. 
Boan v. Richardson, 482 S.E.2d 162 (W. Va. 1996). The 
decision in Buczynski controls this case and the district 
court erred when it denied the City's motion for judgment 
as a matter of law on the equal protection claim. 
 
B. 
 
Similarly, the Retirees' due process claim should have 
been dismissed. The City concedes that the Retirees had a 
valid property interest in their employment and retirement 
benefits. We must, therefore, focus on whether the Retirees 
retired voluntarily or were constructively discharged. See 
Zepp v. Rehrmann, 79 F.3d 381, 385-386 (4th Cir. 1996). 
To make this determination, we examine "the surrounding 
circumstances to test the ability of the employee to exercise 
free choice." Scharf v. Department of the Air Force, 710 F.2d 
1572, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 
Employee resignations and retirements are presumed to 
be voluntary. See Angarita v. St. Louis County, 981 F.2d 
1537, 1544 (8th Cir. 1992). This presumption remains 
intact until the employee presents evidence to establish 
that the resignation or retirement was involuntarily 
procured. Id. If an employee retires of his own free will, 
even though prompted to do so by some action of his 
employer, he is deemed to have relinquished his property 
interest in his continued employment for the government, 
and cannot contend that he was deprived of his due 
process rights. See Hargray v. City of Hallandale, 57 F.3d 
1560, 1567 (11th Cir. 1995); Stone v. University of Md. 
Medical Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 1988). 
There appear to be two circumstances in which an 
employee's resignation or retirement will be deemed 
involuntary for due process purposes: 1) when the employer 
forces the resignation or retirement by coercion or duress, 
or 2) when the employer obtains the resignation or 
retirement by deceiving or misrepresenting a material fact 
to the employee. See Hargray, 57 F.3d at 1568. 
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The Retirees contend that they signed the supplemental 
agreements because of material misrepresentations made 
by Kelly Ryan in the letter she sent on behalf of Sedgwick 
James to an attorney for the F.O.P. The Retirees contend 
that Ryan's letter led them to believe that if they did not 
sign the supplemental agreements, they would not only lose 
their Heart and Lung Act benefits, but also their pension 
and any available worker's compensation benefits. Ryan's 
letter, dated December 3, 1992, stated, in relevant part: 
 
       Enclosed are various supplemental agreements for the 
       following claimants who are currently receiving Heart 
       and Lung Benefits. The medical information in their 
       files indicate that they are suffering from a permanent 
       disability and therefore are not entitled to receive Heart 
       and Lung benefits. . . . Please have the supplemental 
       agreements executed and returned to me by December 
       14, 1992. Once the agreements are received, their 
       wages will be reduced to the compensation rate 
       indicated on the agreement. If anyone decides not to 
       sign the agreement, then I will have no recourse but to 
       file a Termination with the Heart and Lung Panel. 
 
App. at 137. The Retirees argue that their due process 
rights were violated because the letter coerced them into 
retiring. We disagree. 
 
Ryan's letter could not have violated the Retirees' due 
process rights because the Retirees had decided to retire in 
August 1992, four months before they saw Ryan's letter. In 
August 1992, the Retirees volunteered to be placed on a list 
of police officers who had reached 50 years of age and 
provided 25 years of service and who wished to retire at 
some time between January 1, 1992 and December 31, 
1995. See, e.g., App. at 121 (letter from F.O.P. to officers 
describing terms of arbitration award and requirements for 
early retirement incentive), 123-124 (Leheny's Retirement 
Incentive Window Irrevocable Application Form, dated 
August 20, 1992). The City had the right to retire the 
Retirees at any time between January 1, 1992 and 
December 31, 1995, once all List A officers had been retired 
by the City. Thus, the City, by asking the Retirees to sign 
the supplemental agreements, had merely approved the 
Retirees' retirement and had made a determination that the 
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Retirees were permanently disabled. Ryan's letter indicates 
just that: She would seek to terminate Heart and Lung Act 
benefits as part of the officers' retirement on the basis of 
permanent disability. Although it is possible that Ryan's 
letter may have confused Leheny and Ramsey concerning 
the applicable procedures for terminating Heart and Lung 
Act benefits, no part of the letter would lead a reasonable 
police officer to believe that refusal to sign the 
supplemental agreements would result in termination of all 
benefits. 
 
Additionally, we have held that in cases in which "a due 
process claim is raised against a public employer, and 
grievance and arbitration procedures are in place, .. . those 
procedures satisfy due process requirements `even if the 
hearing conducted by the Employer . . . [is] inherently 
biased.' " Dykes v. SEPTA, 68 F.3d 1564, 1571 (3d Cir. 
1995) (quoting Jackson v. Temple Univ., 721 F.2d 931, 933 
(3d Cir. 1983)). Grievance procedures outlined in a 
collective bargaining agreement can satisfy due process 
requirements. Id. at 1572 n.6. 
 
Because Leheny testified that he received the arbitration 
award and attended a meeting in which the award was 
explained, he is deemed to have been aware of the 
applicable grievance procedure. There is no evidence to 
suggest that the Retirees spoke to a supervisor or 
representative of the F.O.P. or the City prior to signing the 
supplemental agreement. The Retirees had ten days to 
investigate the implications of refusing to sign the 
supplemental agreement, ten days to seek the advice of a 
union representative concerning available grievance 
procedures if they did not wish to sign the supplemental 
agreement. If the officers were not convinced that they were 
permanently disabled, their recourse was to go before an 
arbitrator to contest the City's determination of permanent 
disability. Officer Marunich followed this procedure, and as 
a result is not included in the Retirees' due process claim. 
Leheny and Ramsey did not. Not availing themselves of the 
process that was available to them, they may not complain 
now that they were deprived of due process of law. 
 
For all of the above reasons, we conclude that the district 
court erred in not dismissing the due process claim. 
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C. 
 
The district court properly granted summary judgment 
for the City regarding the Retirees' ADA claim. The Retirees 
were unable to establish that they had been victims of 
discrimination under the ADA. 
 
The ADA prohibits discrimination in the terms and 
conditions of employment, and states in relevant part: 
 
       No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
       individual with a disability because of the disability of 
       such individual in regard to job application procedures, 
       the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, 
       employee compensation, job training, and other terms, 
       conditions, and privileges of employment. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12112(a). 
 
       [N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by 
       reason of such disability, be excluded from 
       participation in or be denied the benefits of the 
       services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 
       subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12132. The Retirees contend that the 
arbitration award's early retirement incentive provision 
violates their right to equal compensation under the ADA. 
 
Although the parties dispute whether the Retirees were in 
fact "disabled" for purposes of the ADA, we need not 
address this issue to conclude that the ADA claim was 
properly dismissed. Assuming that the Retirees were 
"disabled," we conclude that they failed to present evidence 
demonstrating that the City impinged upon their right to 
equal compensation. 
 
As the district court properly noted, there is no evidence 
that the Retirees are receiving less than their non-disabled 
counterparts who receive a 75% pension without service 
increments. The evidence establishes that disabled retired 
officers, who receive a 50% pension with service increments 
plus a 66 2/3% worker's compensation award, actually 
receive greater compensation than non-disabled retirees. 
Indeed, the Retirees receive more than 100% of the salary 
they received while actively employed as police officers. 
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The Retirees argue that even though they may receive 
greater compensation than their non-disabled counterparts, 
they are nonetheless victims of ADA-based discrimination 
because non-disabled retirees are able to obtain new 
employment for any amount of compensation and, because 
of their disability, they are limited to the 66 2/3% worker's 
compensation benefits they receive. 
 
Without considering that the Retirees would still face the 
possibility of receiving lesser earnings than non-disabled 
retirees even if they received a 75% pension because non- 
disabled retirees would be able to obtain employment 
elsewhere, we conclude that their argument is not 
persuasive. The Retirees are not prevented from receiving a 
75% pension if they so desire. The arbitration award clearly 
states that every police officer who has attained 50 years of 
age and 25 years of service is entitled to receive a 75% 
pension upon retirement from the police force. Disabled 
officers are not required by the arbitration award to accept 
the 50% pension and 66 2/3% worker's compensation. 
There is nothing in the circumstances presented here that 
prevents a retired police officer from rejecting worker's 
compensation payments and thereby receiving the 75% 
pension. This is made quite clear by the express language 
of the arbitration award: 
 
       In the event that such employee's worker's 
       compensation benefits are reduced or eliminated after 
       retirement, the employee shall be entitled to such 
       pension enhancement as is necessary to maintain a 
       benefit, including worker's compensation, if any, which 
       is 75% of average monthly pay at retirement. 
 
App. at 116. 
 
Our decision today fits squarely with our holding in Ford 
v. Schering-Plough Corp., supra, which, surprisingly, the 
Retirees have cited as support for their position. The 
plaintiff in that case alleged that her former employer's 
insurance plan, which provided a two-year cap for benefits 
for mental disabilities while providing no cap for benefits for 
physical disabilities, violated the ADA. After determining 
that the ADA permits disabled individuals to sue their 
former employers regarding their disability benefits, we 
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addressed the disparity in available benefits for mental and 
physical disabilities. We held that the plaintiff had not 
stated a claim for violation of the ADA: 
 
       Every Schering employee had the opportunity to join 
       the same plan with the same schedule of coverage, 
       meaning that every Schering employee received equal 
       treatment. So long as every employee is offered the 
       same plan regardless of that employee's contemporary 
       or future disability status, then no discrimination has 
       occurred even if the plan offers different coverage for 
       various disabilities. 
 
145 F.3d at 608. 
 
In Ford court we were faced with a stricter benefit plan 
than the one presented here. The disability policy explicitly 
cut off benefits to employees with certain disabilities at the 
same time it continued benefits for employees with other 
types of disabilities. Yet, we ruled that the policy did not 
violate the ADA. 
 
The pension plan and arbitration award presented here 
fall within the teachings of Ford. Every police officer who 
has attained 50 years of age and 25 years of service is 
permitted to receive a 75% pension upon retirement from 
the force; "every employee is offered the same plan 
regardless of that employee's contemporary or future 
disability status." The individual retiree is given the 
responsibility to decide whether or not to accept worker's 
compensation in lieu of a 75% pension. Because every 
eligible retiree is entitled to receive a 75% pension, and 
because each of the Retirees is permitted to receive a 75% 
pension when he no longer receives worker's compensation 
benefits, there is no violation of the ADA. 
 
IV. 
 
In light of the view we take, we need not address the 
remaining arguments presented by the parties. The 
judgment of the district court will be affirmed in part and 
reversed in part in accordance with the foregoing. 
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